Political scientists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing democratization in Russia .
Introduction and Methodology
One of the most important political events in Europe in the late 2 0th century was the implosion of the Soviet political system, bringing to an end the rule of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union an d throughout Eastern and Central Europe . The demise of the Communist political system in Eastern Europ e and then in Russia ushered in competitive elections, a multiparty system, and progress towards a civi l society, all undertaken with the intent of building a democratic political order .
A second important event has been the revival of the Communist Party, particularly in Russia .
Following collapse and banishment in 1991, the Communist Party of Russia reemerged as the primary opposition to market reforms in post-Soviet Russia, thereby shaping the political environment for much o f the 1990s . Today, the Communist Party of Russia is commonly acknowledged as the largest, best funded , and most highly organized political party in Russia, and it is also the leader of anti-reform/anti-syste m parties (see McFaul and Markov, 1993) . Thus, Communist Party political strength is one of the primar y anti-system challenges to the post-socialist political order. The countryside in particular is considered a bastion of Communist electoral strength, so much so that the rural south has been termed the "red belt" b y analysts . The analytical focus in this article is on rural support for the Communist Party .
Political scientists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing democratization in forme r communist states, in particular in Russia, thereby spawning a significant literature (Fish, 1995 ; Dawisha and Parrott, 1997 ; Colton and Hough, 1998 ; Eckstein, et al ., 1998 ; Colton, 2000 ; Colton and McFaul, 2001 ; McFaul, 2001a ; and Anderson, et al ., 2001) . Of notable interest has been the weak party system and a strong president (McFaul, 2001b) .
It is well to remember that parties have dual functions in democracies : (1) to strengthen the party system by providing a balance to the executive ; and (2) to represent the interests of their constituents . In short, a democratic system based on a competitive party system needs competitive (and independent ) parties . The weakness in the Russian party system has not been quantitative : Russia certainly does not lack for parties--J3 parties met registration requirements for the Duma elections of 1993 Duma elections of , 43 in 1995 Duma elections of , an d 26 in 1999 In large part, the weakness in the party system has been qualitative . The weakness in the party system is seen in numerous ways .
First, there are structural weaknesses, referring to the Constitutional arrangements which ar e heavily weighted in favor of the president and give him overwhelming political power . In short, th e Constitution does not provide a balance of power between executive and legislative branches . This outcome was not an accident, but rather was a result of political choice by elites about how to structur e post-Soviet political institutions (McFaul, 2001b) .
A second weakness is organizational and refers to the fact that even for the most influentia l parties, membership is low, the party is centered around a single individual, the party is often regionall y limited, and parties have not coalesced around socio-economic cleavages as in Western Europe . A measure of the organizational weakness of parties is further seen by the fact that no Russian part y nominates candidates for single mandate districts nationwide . In the 1999 Duma election, only two of th e six parties winning party list seats ran candidates in half the single mandate districts (Rose, Munro, an d White, 2001 : 421) .
A third weakness is functional, referring to the fact that parties are not able to hold the Kremli n accountable, have not penetrated state institutions to a significant degree in terms of representation, hav e generally weak interest aggregation and articulation, and party deputies in office are often not accountabl e to their electorate . Richard Rose has referred to this latter development as a system of "floating parties " by which he means there is a disjunction between electoral parties and the formation of parties, fractions , and groupings in the Duma, with the result that the electorate may or may not get what it voted for whe n the Duma convenes (Rose and Munro, 2002 : 101-117) . Fourth, party weakness stems from a lack o f public trust in parties to serve popular interests, a lack of identification with a party, and doubt about th e efficacy of political parties in Russia (McAllister and White, 1995 : 57-59 ) .
Finally, the main weakness in Russia's party system is the absence of strong parties which have wide appeal across various regional and socio-economic variables, are able to remain independent fro m pressure by the Kremlin, are able to balance some of the power concentrated in the Kremlin, and whic h have a realistic chance of capturing either the presidency or a majority of deputies in the Duma . The Communist Party of Russia comes closest to this ideal type, but it is far from it . Communist support i s found only in various regional and socio-economic niches, and the prospect of a Communist president o r Duma majority is small .
The weakness of the party system has direct and significant implications for the nature of Russia n democracy . This article approaches party weakness from a somewhat different angle by examining th e Further, one of the political phenomena under President Putin has been the rapid development of proKremlin parties, which, with Kremlin backing, have gained political clout in a short period of time .
Under Putin, the trend has been for moderate and centrist parties to be even more compliant . Thi s occurrence has allowed Putin to rule in a less confrontational manner than did his predecessor, Bori s Yeltsin. But this trend also portends of the erosion of party independence from influence of the center . If electoral support for the Communist Party further weakens, significant opposition to the Kremlin and it s policies are in doubt. Thus, if Russia had an unbalanced political system in terms of the distribution o f political power in the 1990s, the shift of power to the Kremlin and away from parties may become eve n greater in the future, thereby perpetuating a weak party system and forestalling democratic consolidation .
In short, this article argues that although the Communist Party has been largely anti-system, it i s the most important and most independent party in Russia's weak party system . The upshot is if the Communist Party is weak in the countryside, which it has used to support its reemergence, th e implications are twofold : (1) reformers have real opportunities to make significant inroads into the rura l vote, for which there is already supporting evidence ; and (2) the impact may be a further weakening o f the party system, attendant with even more power shifting away from parties to the executive .
The article makes two contributions to the existing literature . First, it examines in detail a subject which heretofore has been absent . The article is motivated by the fact that analysts have correctl y identified an important urban/rural cleavage in Russian voting patterns, and more generally, in Russia n politics, thereby conforming to one aspect of the Lipset/Rokkan model of party cleavages (1967) .3 However, for contemporary Russia we lack an understanding of political cleavages within the rural sector. (Gill, 1994) , and thus the purpose here is to provide a brief overview of some of the main trends which transpired . In general, during the demise of the CPSU and the Soviet political system four main trends were evident .
(1) From 1988 on, the more Gorbachev liberalized the political system, the more the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) declined . There was an inverse relationship between democratizatio n and continued rule of the CPSU, an inherent tension which led to fissures in the party between reformer s and conservatives .
(2) As the party became hopelessly divided, reformers and conservatives fought over urba n support for their policy platforms . "The groups that bore the brunt of the economic decline--the older and middle aged , women, and inhabitants of the small towns and countryside--were not those that would g o into the streets in protest. Yeltsin's own base of support in the larger cities would b e protected." (Hough, Davidheiser, and Lehmann, 1996 : 9) The beginning of the end for the CPSU may be dated to the 19th Party Conference in June 1988 , at which Gorbachev introduced measures to democratize the CPSU (Bialer, 1989) . Later that same year Gorbachev pushed through a decision for competitive elections in 1989 to elect a new legislative body, the Congress of Peoples Deputies (CPD), that would replace the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet .5 The initial fruits of democratization were the first contested elections in Soviet history, held in March 1989 .6 The March election, which required a candidate to receive 50 percent of the vote in his/he r district (with 50 percent turnout), led to some notable defeats of important Communist leaders . In the Russia Republic, 21 of 55 Communist Party regional first secretaries were defeated . Many of the worst defeats came when Communist candidates ran unopposed (Hough, 1997 : 165-66) . Despite the fact that Communist members comprised 87 percent of the CPD deputies, the elections were seen as a "grea t defeat" for the Communist Party (Hough, 1997 : 167) . Gorbachev notes that following the 1989 election, a meeting of the Politburo at the end of March found "most of the members were depressed, and failure wa s in the air" (Gorbachev, 1996 : 281) . The malaise spread to party members at large . After increasing about two percent a year during the 1970s and 1980s, starting in 1989 party membership began to decline fo r the first time since Stalin's purges, and the decline accelerated in 1990 (Hill, 1992 : 78) . The exodus from the party was especially significant in the republics of the Caucasus .
In March 1990, the Communist monopoly on power ended when Article 6 of the Sovie t Constitution was abolished . That same month, republican elections were held in Russia and the othe r republics to replace the old legislative Soviet system . The 1990 election in Russia confirmed the end o f the Communist stronghold on the largest cities and large urban settlements generally .' The Communist Party was a party of industrial workers and based its support on large cities, with considerably weake r support in rural areas . Party control of social and economic organizations was much stronger in cities, an d party penetration, as measured by membership, was considerably less in the countryside (Hill and Frank , 1982 : 35-37) .
Given these political realities, one can appreciate the surprise following the 1990 Russia n election, in which reformist and liberal candidates did best in large cities, while conservative candidate s did best in settlements with less than 50,000 residents . In settlements with a population of less than 50,000, 181 conservative deputies were elected, while only 47 radical (strongly pro-market reform ) deputies were elected (Hough, 1997 : 297) . Thus, an important shift in electoral support became eviden t during the first competitive elections in the Soviet Union, with the Communist Party losing its traditional base of support to radical reformers . Thereafter, further damage was inflicted as the CPSU experienced fissures in its own ranks . In June 1990 the Russian Communist Party (RCP) was founded as an outgrowth of the CPSU .8 The RCP existed from June 1990 through late August 1991 .9 The creation of the RCP represented a n "organizational vehicle for those Russian Communists who actively opposed Gorbachev's increasingly far-reaching reformism" (Urban and Solovei, 1997: 38) . The RCP reached its low point in 1991 .
In June 1991 Boris Yeltsin was elected president of Russia, capturing nearly 60 percent of th e vote nationwide . However, the urban-rural divide was again evident, as Yeltsin captured 70 percent of th e vote in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 64 .5 percent of the vote in densely urban areas, but only 51 percent o f the vote in areas that were less than 60 percent urban . In July 1991, Yeltsin banned all political parties i n state organizations and enterprises in Russia, an act that was aimed at the RCP since it was the dominan t political organization in Russia. In August 1991, following the failed coup to overthrow USSR Presiden t Gorbachev, Yeltsin suspended the activities of the RCP and nationalized its property . A week later, th e USSR Supreme Court acted similarly toward the CPSU throughout the USSR . In early November 1991 , Yeltsin issued a presidential decree which banned the CPSU and the RCP from Russia_ Thereafter, th e CPSU split into several factions, mass defections occurred, and party property was seized (Gill, 1994 : 175) .
In November 1992, the banning of the RCP was declared unconstitutional by Russia' s Constitutional Court, although the decision was ambiguous (Urban and Solovei, 1997 : 32-33) . Based upon this decision, the Communist Party was able to reconstitute itself, and the founding congress of th e Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was held in February 1993 . However, the road t o recovery was neither linear nor easy . The party continued to be plagued by weak urban support. For example, one of the questions in the April 1993 referendum asked whether the respondent trusted Bori s Yeltsin as president. More than two-thirds of residents in Moscow and St . Petersburg responded yes, as did six in ten respondents in highly urbanized areas . The less the area was urbanized, the lower the leve l of trust in Yeltsin.
Another main obstacles was the relationship with the executive branch, specifically Boris Yeltsin , who continued to press his role as an anti-communist reformer . The struggle between "liberals" and "conservatives" came to a head in September 1993 when Yeltsin illegally dissolved the Parliament, a power not envisioned in the Constitution (see Yeltsin, 1994 : 255) . A standoff ensued, during which time Russia had either two presidents or no Parliament, depending on to whom one was talking . But the perception of blame for the crisis was clear, as summarized by one of Yeltsin's spokesmen : "no concessions to Red Soviets, no concessions to Stalinists and fascists" (Reddaway and Glinski, 2001 : 425) .
After nearly a month-long siege, the standoff was "resolved" with force, as Yeltsin ordered the shelling o f the Parliament building in October 1993 . Force was used to defeat conservatives, and the stalemat e between the executive and legislative branches was broken, with the executive emerging victorious .
Following the October crisis, a new post-Soviet political system was established, along with a new Constitution . Elections were called for December 12, 1993 to ratify the Constitution and to elec t representatives to a new legislative system (the Federal Assembly), comprised of two independent house s (White, Rose, and McAllister, 1997 : 92-106 ; Remington, 2001a : 45-61) .10 After meeting registration requirements, party candidates had only about six weeks to conduct their campaigns . The political order that emerged bestowed upon the president predominant power in the system, with the Communist Part y having to fight for influence as an anti-system party in a weak legislative branch and party system.
The Role of Rural Support in Communist Revival, 1993-200 0
At the beginning of economic reform in Russia, logic would hold that those with the most privilege would be most resistant to reform. As reforms unfolded, the assumption by many analysts wa s that :
...those is a privileged position in the old system would be very reluctant to support a radical economic reform that threatened the old institutions or that exposed workers t o sharp price increases and unemployment . . ..The larger the city, the better the living conditions . .. .Life in small towns and villages in the provinces seemed a throwback to decades ago .. . .For all these reasons, if privilege were the crucial factor, those living i n large cities should have been disproportionately conservative . Those living in smal l towns and the countryside should have advocated radical change because they were especially disadvantaged." (Hough, Davidheiser, and Lehmann, 1996 : 5-6) With the introduction of democratization and competitive elections in the Soviet Union and the n Russia, however, it became clear that the base of political support for the Communist Party was not the voter who resided in large cities, but rather the voter in small towns and the countryside . Table 1 below . Special attention should be paid to the importance of th e rural vote to Communist Party electoral performance . Sources : Author' s calculations from election data; Clem and Craumer, 1995 : 592; Rossiiskie regiony nakanune vyborov-95, 1995 ; Itogi vyborov, 2000; Marsh, 2002 : 67, 83, 92 ; and www .rusline 
Characteristics of the Rural Supporter for the Communist Part y
In Russia, there is an inverse relationship between the size of a population settlement and suppor t for reform candidates : the larger the settlement, the higher the level of electoral support ; the smaller the settlement, the higher the electoral support for the Communist candidates (Colton, 1998 : 75-114 ; Clem and Craumer, 2002 : 1-12) . This section analyzes the characteristics and behaviors of rural communist supporters, based on the survey data explained above .
One of the survey questions asked "for which party did you vote in the 1999 Duma election? "
The responses included "Communist Party," "Liberal Democratic Party," "Edinstvo," "Other Democratic
Parties," "Did Not Vote" and "Don't Remember ." Of the 800 respondents in the sample, 196 voted for th e Communist Party, which was second only to the 245 votes for Edinstvo . From these responses, a dummy variable was created to capture "Communist supporters" and "non-communist supporters ." An analysis o f the characteristics of rural supporters of the Communist Party is provided below using this dichotomou s variable.
The conventional view of the typical Communist supporter is that he/she tends to be older, with a secondary or less than secondary education, occupies the lower income brackets, has a standard of livin g that is barely above subsistence, neither supports reform nor participates in the "new economy" to an y significant degree, and is opposed to the course of state policy (Brudny, 2001 : 166 ; Colton, 2000 : 72-82 ; Wyman, 2001 : 75-80) . Similar to most conventional wisdom, there is an element of truth to thes e characteristics .
The survey data confirm that Communist supporters tend to be somewhat older, with a mean ag e of 57, whereas non-communist supporters have a mean age of 50 . Communist supporters economically disadvantaged? Some analysts have argued that pocketbook issues , or otherwise known as sociotropic variables, influence voting patterns in post-Soviet Russia (Colton, 1996) . The survey data cast new light on this question . In the sample as a whole, the mean monthly monetary income on a per capita basis is 1,418 .2 rubles (about $49 at prevailing exchange rates in 2001) .
Of respondents who voted, Communist supporters had the lowest mean monthly per capita income at 1,439 .8 rubles . Voters who voted for Edinstvo have the highest per capita monetary income at 1,707 .8 rubles, followed by voters for "other democratic parties" at 1,691 rubles . This distribution is explained b y the fact that Communist supporters tend to be somewhat older, and non-communist supporters somewhat younger . This is important because younger people are more likely to start new private businesses which earn more money, and generally are more entrepreneurial than older individuals . Older individual s depend more heavily on transfer payments from the state. Second, a large portion of unemployed or retired are Communist supporters-those two groups depress the income mean somewhat, but provid e over 64 percent of total Communist support in the sample, and the retired give more support to th e Communist Party than any other party or non-party (no party) . If the these two cohorts are removed from the pro-communist cohort, the mean income of working individuals who support the Communist Party i s closer to the mean income of non-communist supporters . 11 Overall, Communist supporters have mean monthly monetary incomes that surpass the mean for the entire sample . Furthermore, Communist supporters have similar levels of productive capital compared to noncommunist supporters. Communist and non-communist households have insignificant differences i n terms of the mean number of cows, pigs, goats, sheep, and poultry . These family holdings are a basi c source of household food production and thus affect to a significant degree how well and how much th e family eats . In addition, both types of households have essentially equal possession rates of automobile s and motorcycles, which provide not only transportation to a nearby urban settlement but also ar e important for transporting food to town for sale . Therefore, in terms of productive capital, Communist an d non-communist households are essentially equal .
Finally, the very poorest individuals-those with less than one half the subsistence level i n monetary income in 2001--give more support to the pro-Kremlin party Edinstvo (Unity) and to "no party" than the Communist Party. The data show that the second poorest category-those with from onehalf to three-quarters the subsistence minimum-also give more support to Edinstvo and to "no party " than the Communist Party . Only in the non-poverty grouping-individuals with 1 .1 times or more the subsistence level-does the Communist Party receive more support than Edinstvo or no party . These data are shown in Table 2 . Based on these data, the idea that the Communist party has attracted supporters who are th e poorest of the poor and who are acutely disadvantaged is shown to be misleading . Communist supporter s are somewhat less advantaged than non-communist households, for instance in per capita income and in human capital . Communist households have a mean of 2 .81 persons while non-communist households have a mean of 3 .17 persons, a difference that translates into more labor power to grow food and t o engage in commercial agriculture if desired . On the whole, however, economic differences are no t significant. The main difference between Communist and non-communist voters is in the size of a rental lan d plot. A rental plot is different from a household plot in that the land is leased, not owned, for a define d period of time; the land is likely to be located some distance from the household ; and statistically, rental land is more likely to be used to grow food for sale rather than household consumption . Communist and non-communist supporters have similar rates of rental plot usage (34 .7 percent for Communist voters to 33 .3 percent of non-communist voters) . However, non-communist voters' rental plots have a mean size o f .62, whereas communist voters plots have a mean size of .11 hectares . This difference may be partially due to age, as households with a higher mean age have less labor power than younger families, keeping in mind that nearly all households already have a pre-existing household plot . Overall, it is difficult t o conclude that communist households have not used the opportunities created by land reform .
Utilization of Reform Opportunities

Satisfaction, Mood and Participatio n
A third common belief about Communist supporters is that they are dissatisfted with state policies, are unhappy with life and the situation in the country, and may withdraw into isolation as a result of dissatisfaction and unhappiness . The survey data again provide results that necessitate modification o f the conventional wisdom regarding satisfaction, mood, and participation as shown in Table 3 below. "Support for" variables are scaled 1-5, with 1=absolutely reject and 5=absolutely agree. "Satisfaction" variables are scaled 1-5, with 1=absolutely dissatisfied and 5=absolutely satisfied. "Personal Mood" variables are scaled 1-4, with 1=never, 2=sometimes, 3=often, and 4=most of the time . "Participation" variables are scaled 0-5 with 0=never, 1=very seldom, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4-often, and 5 -very often.
Source : Survey data, 2001 .
Turning first to evaluations of state policy, one of the questions asked "how do you evaluate state policy, as it relates to the countryside, which has been conducted during the past years?" The mos t striking fact is the lack of opposition for state policies among all rural dwellers, which suggests neutralit y or ambivalence . This response is remarkable given the deterioration in the standard of living, both relativ e and in absolute terms, which occurred during the 1990s . Within the rural cohort, non-communis t supporters are somewhat more supportive of state policy, and Communist supporters somewhat less supportive, but the differences are not especially large . Although the mean scores of Communist voter s lag the sample mean and the mean of non-communist supporters, the data do not strongly uphold the vie w of Communist supporters being strident opponents of state policies . For some policy reform s Communists' responses tend toward neutral, while for others such as wage policy there is significan t opposition .
Moreover, there are not significant differences between Communist and non-communist in term s of satisfaction with life in general . Separate survey questions asked the respondent to "evaluate your leve l of satisfaction towards different aspects of life ." Communist and non-communist supporters have ver y similar responses, with non-communist supporters somewhat more satisfied with life and the situation i n the country, although again the differences are not large .
Turning to personal mood, it is apparent that Communist supporters are not significantly mor e sad or lonely, or conversely, less happy, than non-communist supporters . Separate questions asked about Communist supporters display similar rates of community participation . This analysis portends future electoral weakness of the CPRF because it suggests that there are few political niches, issues, or cohorts that Communist candidates can exploit . In short, the CPRF is not able to target or to build support from a base of economically disadvantaged, alienated, discontented persons who resist reform through thei r behaviors .
There is further evidence that portends of Communist political weakness . This weakness is seen by the fact that "traditional" sources of support for the Communist Patty as not as strong as believed .
Traditional sources of support for the CPRF come from the poor and economically disadvantage d (including those in poverty), the unemployed, workers, and the retired . Communist candidates hav e explicitly targeted these groups in their policy speeches. The survey data demonstrate that rural support among these cohorts is not particularly strong for the CPRF, as shown in Table 4 below . The table demonstrates Communist Party weakness among different cohorts . Table 4 is based on an open ended survey question which asked "which party today best represents your interests?" Of the nine categories in Table 4 , respondents answered that the CPRF best represents their interests in only on e of the categories : those who are not working (of whom the vast majority are retired) . For the other eight categories, the CPRF either trailed the pro-Kremlin party Edinstvo, or "no party," or both. The table further demonstrates the significant inroads that the pro-government Edinstvo has made in a short perio d of time. Edinstvo was formed in the autumn of 1999 as a centrist coalition which was given Kremlin support . In the December 1999 Duma election, Edinstvo had widespread regional support, seen by th e fact that it was supported by no less than 30 regional governors.
Further, it was headed by well-known politicians who were considered politically "clean" (Marsh , 2002 : 88-89 (Remington, 2001b : 303) , and the resignation of Communist committee chairmen in mid-2002 served to increase th e Kremlin's legislative power even more, thereby leading analysts to conclude that Putin's Russia is a "managed democracy" (Moses, 2003) .
It is especially significant to note the prevalence of the "no party" response . In six of the nine categories, respondents answered that "no party" best represents their interests, an indication of th e alienation of the rural voter from party politics and the belief that parties are not effective . There is little evidence that the Communist Party is poised to take advantage of rural alienation from politics and othe r parties. In fact, despite the fact that the retired give high levels of support to the Communist Party, th e evidence suggests that the CPRF is not meeting the needs of its core constituency, the rural old . 14 One o f the axioms of Russian politics is that the older voter provides the primary base of electoral support fo r Communist candidates . However, the survey data suggest that there is more to the story, as indicated i n This fording is important for two reasons: first, rural women outnumber rural men, significantly a t upper age brackets (50 and above); and second, it suggests that CPRF policies are not perceived a s meeting the social needs of older women, who tend to head the rural household . In this respect, Putin' s policy of paying pension arrears and increasing pension levels are likely to further erode Communis t support among pension-age rural dwellers . Therefore, even among the cohort of voters believed to be th e strongest Communist supporters there is evidence of electoral weakness on the part of the CPRF .
Conclusion
Russia faces numerous obstacles along its path of democratization, among them a constitutio n which places most power in the hands of the executive, political recentralization during Putin's rule, attempts to lessen the independence of regional leaders, and attempts to streamline the party system int o fewer parties, to be led by pro-Kremlin parties in Duma . While it certainly would be an exaggeration t o say Russia's party system is under assault or is endangered, it is not an exaggeration to say that trends are not favorable for the consolidation of a vibrant party system with strong opposition parties to balance th e influence of the Kremlin .
The Communist Party plays an integral role in Russia's party system . As an independent and opposition party, the strength of the Communist Party helps define the vibrancy of the party system itself.
Once the Communist Party fell from power, it reemerged as an anti-system party on the back of the vot e from small towns and rural dwellers . Therefore, the primary electoral cleavage in contemporary Russia i s an urban-rural divide . The reliance by the Communist Party upon the rural voter for a large part o f electoral support has enormous implications for Russian politics and the party system as a whole .
The importance of rural electoral support for the CPRF is threefold. First, although Communist
Party members have higher rates of party identification than other parties (Wyman, White, Miller an d Heywood, 1995 ; McFaul 2001b) , this paper has shown that the rural Communist supporter is no t particularly distinctive in economic, behavioral, or psychological attributes . Support for the Communist Party does not appear to be driven by economic need or a sense of alienation . In short, there are limits on how much Communist candidates can exploit the "misery of the market" or play upon specific economic, social, or psychological consequences thereof. This reality serves to blunt the message of Communis t candidates and limits their appeal .
Second, this paper suggests that there is a divorce between personal behavior and politica l Third, the paper showed the emerging importance of a non-party preference in the countrysid e and weak support for the CPRF among different cohorts which are believed to be primary supporters o f the CPRF, such as the elderly . Support for the CPRF declines among women aged 60 and above . It i s notable that rural women of pension age constitute over 15 percent of the entire rural population, and previous research showed that older and rural voters have higher turnout rates than do younger and urban voters . This trend shows that the Communist Party is vulnerable to state policies, such as paying bac k pensions or raising pension levels (as Putin has done), leading to the perception among elderly voters that the Communist Party may not be able to improve living standards significantly over their present levels .
These three trends suggest that while the CPRF was able to rebuild its political strength on th e back of the rural voter during the 1990s, it is not clear that the rural vote will sustain the party in future elections . 16 Indeed, election data suggest that the strength and influence of the CPRF peaked in the mid1990s and declined thereafter, both in the Duma and throughout society . If the analysis about the characteristics of the rural voter is correct, it is reasonable to conclude that the electoral strength of th e CPRF may continue to decline in the future.
The importance of an erosion in electoral support for the primary opposition party to th e Kremlin's power is enormous . Such an occurrence would mean even more influence for the Kremlin an d less for parties, especially those that attempt to remain somewhat independent of the Kremlin . In a system with unbalanced political power, the weaker the opposition, the more endangered is the democrati c process . Ironically, Russia needs a strong Communist Party to ensure a vibrant party system . ENDNOTE S ' However, only a handful of parties ran candidates in a majority of Russia's 89 regions ; only four parties contested all thre e elections ; and only three surpassed the five percent threshold in each election (Remington, 2001 : 192) .
